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DEATH ROW CONDITIONS: PROGRESSION TOWARD
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
In July of 1983, George Clayton graduated from an Ohio community col-
lege with a degree in business administration. Clayton, a native of Cleveland's
East Side, might neatly fall into the vast demographic pool of young,
midwestern business graduates were it not for one unique item on his cur-
riculum vitae: Clayton spent twenty-eight months on Ohio's death row.
Sentenced to death at nineteen for the killing of a Bedford Heights police of-
ficer, Clayton's sentence was ultimately reduced to serving time with the
general prison population at Lucasville.1
At present, thirty seven states retain a statutory death penalty.2 Twenty
eight states operate prisons containing a separate death row for capitally-sen-
tenced inmates. Over 1500 individuals await sentence modification or execu-
tion in these designated units for the condemned.' The national rate of reversal
of death sentences is as high as forty-five percent for those death row inmates
pursuing appeal and federal habeas corpus with the assistance of counsel.,
Yet, post-conviction review is a time-consuming process: the average
death row inmate spends six to ten years on death row.' Lamentably, the rate
of sentence reversal and the length-of-stay statistics are lowered by the acute
shortage of attorney representation for the capitally-sentenced inmate's pursuit
of sentence review.' Still more appalling is the human rights crisis that is
epitomized by the conditions of confinement and the circumstances of waiting
on death row.'
Beginning with recapitulation of the quest for the meaning and scope of
'Evans, A Walk Down Ohios Death Row. Cleve. Plain Dealer, July 24, 1983, § I at 30, col. I.
2Henry Schwarzchild, A.C.L.U. Capital Punishment Project Director, Remarks at the Meeting of the
American Civil Liberties Union Capital Punishment Project (1985) [hereinafter cited as Panel Remarks
(available in audio cassette form from the A.C.L.U.).
3Id.
1Id. See also. Brief for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. at 17-18,
Groseclose v. Dutton, No. 85-5525 16th Cir. 1985) Ihereinafter cited as brief for Amicus Curiael "The Fund"
compiles period death row statistics indicating the number, race, geographic location and judicial disposition
of death row inmates. In a Fund study conducted in Texas, eighty out of 206 capital appeals (38.8%) in the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals were reversed. In Kentucky, six out of thirteen capital appeals (46%1
decided to date have produced reversals, in Tennessee, fifteen out of thirty-nine capital appeals (38.5%)
have resulted in reversal. The Fund's studies also indicate that, since 1978, sixty-four of the 143 capital
federal habeas corpus appeals filed nationally have produced favorable results for the petitioner. See also.
Greenburg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 918 (1982) (Greenburg gauged the capital
sentence reversal rate as of 1980 to sixty percent, exclusive of Texas and Georgia death row inmates re-
moved from the row under prior sentencing statutes subsequently deemed unconstitutional.)
'Groseclose v. Dutton, 609 F. Supp. 1432, 1447 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). See also, Brief for Amicus Curiae. supra
note 4, at 15-16. (Fund statistical data corraborating the District Court's finding as to length-of-stay on
death row).
'Panel Remarks, supra note 2.
'Joel Berger, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Remarks at the Meeting of the Ohio Death
Penalty Task Force's Death Row Conditions Committee (Oct. I I, 19851.
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the eighth amendment,8 this comment will review both the evolution of
judicial scrutiny and the constitutional limitations of criminal incarceration
and will also analyze the narrow body of case law affecting the quality of life
on America's death rows.
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The United States Supreme Court provided a somber, if elusive, standard
for measuring the humanity of punishment in its 1958 ruling that "the basic
concept underlying the eighth amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man."9 While concise words or evidence explaining the purpose and meaning
of the Bill of Rights proscription against cruel and unusual punishment is ab-
sent from the records of Congress,"0 the bill's adoption of the pertinent lang-
uage of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 suggests consideration of English
penal history as a means of deducing the eighth amendment's mission."
Commentators suggest that England's 1689 prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment responded to the Crown's arbitrary imposition of barbaric
penalties for a vast range of offenses, many of which would be considered petty
by contemporary standards. 2 Acknowledging the fact that burning, drawing
and quartering penalties accompanied the colonists to America, any early con-
cern that punishment must fit the crime was obviated when the crime was
deemed heinous."
While these practices had virtually disappeared in America by 1789, the
authoring of a Bill of Rights prohibition against cruelty in punishment
reflected the framers' intent to finally forbid the extreme cruelty evident in
"aggravations attendant upon execution.""' Further expansion upon the pur-
pose and intent of the eighth amendment's draftsmen would be a piece-meal
progression, beginning with the 1878 Supreme Court consideration 5 of
whether one mode of execution was humane, and therefore more constitu-
tional than another, and continuing to the present.
'U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.")
'Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
'"I ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789).
"Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839,
840 11969).
'
21d. at 852-60. But see, H. BEDAU. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERWIA. 3-7 1976) Ihereinafter cited as Bedaul
(A law enacted in 1565 which made pocket-picking a capital offense was not repealed until 1810; as late as
1812, individuals convicted of high treason were punished by "drawing, hanging, disemboweling and then
beheading, followed by quartering.").
"BEDAU. supra note 12, at 16 (Witchcraft and slave rebellion, by colonial standards, were acts punishable by
"aggravated" execution.)
"Id.
"Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (finding the death penalty not perse unconstitutional).
[Vol. 19:2
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COMMENTS
THE HANDS OFF DOCTRINE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT To
HUMANE PRISON CONDITIONS
While American courts have traditionally expressed reluctance to in-
terfere with the operations of prisons and the expert judgment of prison ad-
ministrators, 6 the propriety of applying an eighth amendment scrutiny to
prison conditions is a well-settled issue." The 1962 decision which made the
eighth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, 8 and the subsequent flood of litigation have, however, indicated
that the concept of judicial abstention still retains some vitality in the area of
prison conditions. In the past, judicial "intrusion" into state corrections opera-
tions has sparked controversy concerning federalism and separation of
powers. 9 The lingering effect of this controversy has been judicial reluctance
to reach the merits of prison conditions claims.
The most common means of bringing a claim of cruel and unusual condi-
tions of confinement is in federal court in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for depriva-
tion of a federally-protected right (based on the eighth amendment) under color
of state law.2" Habeas corpus is also available for challenging prison
conditions."
While judicial abstention, or the "hands-off doctrine,"22 suggests a juris-
dictional bar to federal court review of an issue, in the context of prison condi-
tions litigation it "has nothing to do with jurisdiction or justiciability; at most it
reflects a conservative judicial approach to review of prison practices on the
merits."23 The problematic effect of judicial unwillingness to delve into a con-
stitutional examination of conditions of confinement is profound. Court reluc-
tance to provide a test or judicially-fashioned standards of prison conditions
maintains a vicious cycle where the concept of "cruel and unusual
punishment" remains an elusive and abstract concept, 4 and legislators and ad-
ministrators are left without guidelines for constitutional prison administra-
tion.
Further, so long as state laws giving corrections officials undefined con-
"Hirschkopf & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life. 55 VA. L. REv. 795, 812 (1969).
"Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
"Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"
9See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 306 (197 1) (Respondent corrections officials unsuccessfully claimed
that a suit against the Corrections Agency of the State of Arkansas was barred by the eleventh amendment).
*M. HERMAN & M. HAFT, PRISONERS- RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK. 244 (1973) (Author's Note: This comment will
not specifically address conditions claims based on the fourteenth amendment due process clause, nor the
sixth amendment).
2 Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (197 1).
"Herman & Haft, supra note 20 at 244.
21d.
2
'See generally, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981l.
Fall, 1985]
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trol of prison management receive such implicit judicial immunity, both the ju-
diciary and the legislature are rendered impotent to respond to human rights
abrogations. To the prisoner, and especially the death row inmate, judicial ab-
stinence from cases not rising to the level of egregiousness established by prece-
dent represents a practical absence of avenues for redress of what may be a
valid claim of constitutional violation."
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
Until the 1981 Supreme Court case, Rhodes v. Chapman,26 federal courts
lacked High Court determination of the constitutional method or measure of
eighth amendment application to prison conditions" upon which to base their
decisions. Arguably, Chapman did not provide such a judicial key. Instead, a
totality of the conditions approach was apparently employed,28 but the steps in
the adopted totality test were not clearly set forth."
In holding the practice of an Ohio maximum security prison whereby pris-
oners were double-celled to be constitutional, the Chapman majority's "totali-
ty" standard largely rested upon concepts distilled from the Court's rulings on
capital punishment, rather than adoption of lower court prison conditions ap-
proaches." A focused concurring opinion,3 penned by Justice Brennan and
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, embraced the more defined prison
conditions stance of one lower court32 and acknowledged the abundance of
lower court litigation33 on the issue, as well as the consequent mass of "unpleas-
ant" reading on the matter." Although the Chapman majority opinion unques-
tionably approves the often-used "totality" theory, it is the concurring opinion
that courageously wades through analogous, albeit lower court, facts and hold-
ings in search of the acceptable mid-point between "comfortable prisons on the
model of country clubs"35 and "soul-chilling inhumanity of conditions."36
Although Chapman has been interpreted as the Court's adoption of a
"totality of the conditions" theory by the fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth cir-
s"But ee. Rubin, Section 1983.'A LimitedAccess Highway, 52 AM. L. REv. 977, 978 (1983) (Rubin suggests
that some prisoners' civil rights claims are meritless attacks, generally filed pro se. by inmates venting hostili-
ty toward the system.)
11452 U.S. 337 (1981).
2
'7d. at 346.
-Id. at 347. (Conditions "alone or in combination may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of
life's basic necessities."
-'Id. at 337-52 (Justice Powell authored the majority's opinion.)
-Id.
'lId. at 352-68.
'1d. at 364 (citing Laaman v. Helgemoe. 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977)).
"Id. at 354 n. 2.
-ld. at 354.
"Id.
I Id. (citing Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (Mass. 1973)).
[Vol. 19:2
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cuits" the subtle difference between the Chapman majority and concurring
opinions must be articulated in order to understand the meaning of the Chap-
man totality test. In brief, the Chapman majority speaks in the abstract and
declines the opportunity for judicial activism in prison reform.3" In contrast,
the concurring justices edge closer to complete judicial abandonment of the
hands-off doctrine and would guide future litigation with a practical checklist39
and the admonishment that "cases are not decided in the abstract.""0
A. Abstract Cruelty
In Weems v. United States,' the Court reviewed the decision of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, affirming the conviction of a public
official for falsifying an official document."2 Petitioner had been sentenced to
"hard and painful labor for a period ranging from twelve years and one day to
twenty years and ... carrying during his imprisonment a chain at the ankle
hanging from the wrist . . ., ' as well as deprivation of his civil rights during
confinement, termination of all post-confinement political rights and
surveillance by the authorities for the rest of his life." In holding this penalty to
be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, the Court's prescient opinion not only
dismissed interpretive confinement of eighth amendment prohibitions to
physical torture like that imposed under the English reign of the Stuarts, ' but
also framed the theory that a sentence may be disproportionate to the crime. '
A trilogy of death penalty cases would, years later, revive the "proportion-
ality" theory of Weems.47 This theory was ultimately adopted by the Court as
forbidding "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"" including that which
is "totally without penological justification."' 9 Denial of medical care to prison-
"See e.g.. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 428 (4th Cir. 1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 568 (5th Cir.
1981); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1981): Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851. 854
(8th Cir. 1981).




'217 U.S. 349 (1910).
421d. at 357.
'
31d. at 383 (White, J., dissenting).
"Id.
4
1See supra, note II; but see. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971) (punishment that is
"shocking to the conscience" is eighth amendment threshold).
4' Weems, 217 U.S. at 379. (The Court invalidated Weems' sentence after weighing the "mischief" lalteration
of a ledger] and the "remedy.")
"Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens), Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239. 458 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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ers5° and deprivations of basic human needs of inmates" have been held uncon-
stitutional on this ground, where the deprivations were found to be cruel and
unusual, aimless and overly-severe. However, "conditions that cannot be said
to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitution-
al. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are
part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against socie-
ty. 52
An off-shoot of the proportionality argument is the evaluative approach
that considers the relationship between prison conditions and "governmental
interests" in maintaining prison order, security and rehabilitation of
prisoners. The rule that prisoners' rights may be abridged if necessary to fur-
ther penal objectives of order, security and rehabilitation has permitted im-
pingement of prisoners' first" and fourth 5 amendment rights. Depending on
the meaning of "cruel and unusual," eighth amendment rights may be subject
to abridgement under this theory.
The missing piece in the abstract approach to eighth amendment scrutiny
is the very element the Chapman majority refused to provide: there is "no
static 'test' . . . by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement
are cruel and unusual. ' 56 In explanation of the omission of this key component
to a judicial litmus test, the majority referred to the oft-quoted Trop v. Dulles57
direction that the eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 58
B. Toward Concrete Standards
Although the Chapman majority's espousal of a totality of the cir-
cumstances theory failed to fully explain the theory, the Chapman opinion,
and especially the detailed explanation of the totality approach provided by
"Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
"Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
"
2Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). See also. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974);
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
5
"Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974). (The Court held that censorship of prisoner mail is
constitutional if the practice furthers the important or substantial governmental interest of prison security,
order or prisoner rehabilitation, and if such restriction of first amendment freedoms is no greater than
necessary to protect the government interest.)
'Id; See also, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (A prison is
not a public forum; prisoners' right to free speech and assembly curtailed by security interests); Pell v. Pro-
cunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (Prison officials may regulate prisoners' communications with media by
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions if necessary to further government interests.)
5 Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3202 (1984) (inmates held not to have reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in their cells entitling them to protection against searches and deprivation of property by prison
guards.)
'Chapman, 452 U.S. at 346.
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concurring Justice Brennan,59 provided lower courts with significant guidance
as to ruling on the merits of prison conditions claims. The Chapman majority's
recognition that "[clonditions . . .alone or in combination, may deprive in-
mates of the minimum civilized measure of life's necessities"' 6 suggested lower
court definition of both "combination" claims and "necessities." Cases follow-
ing Chapman have acknowledged the Court's reference to the totality of condi-
tions analysis to varying degrees,6' but have predictably followed the Court's
confinement of scrutiny to basic needs only.62
In Ruiz v. Estelle,63 the Fifth Circuit applied a totality test to the vastly
over-crowded Texas prison systems. Noting that the Chapman Court had, in
its assessment of the lower courts' findings of fact, considered that essential
food, medical care or sanitation were not compromised, conditions had not
caused an increase in violence or created other conditions intolerable for prison
confinement and conditions had not greatly diminished job and educational
opportunities,6" the court of appeals incorporated such considerations in its
review of Ruiz.
Affirming the district court's finding that the conditions in various Texas
institutions violated the eighth amendment, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
approved the district court's acceptance of, and weighting of, the type of
"Chapman, 452 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring) citing Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269
(D.N.H. 1977). The concurring decision's adoption of the eighth amendment scrutiny used in the district
court rule of Laaman also provides guidance to the prison conditions litigant: "When 'the cumulative impact
of the conditions of incarceration threatens the physical, mental and emotional health and well-being of the
inmate(s) and/or creates a probability of recidivism and future incarceration', the court must conclude that
the conditions violate the Constitution." The concurring Justices also implicitly expand on the majority's
reference to "minimal necessities" by urging courts to examine the elements of prison conditions enumerated
in Laaman and their effect upon the inmates, including:
11.1 The condition of the physical plant (lighting, heat, plumbing, ventilation, living space, noise
levels, recreation space);
[2.1 sanitation (control of vermin and insects, food preparation, medical facilities, lavoratories and
showers, clean places for eating, sleeping and working);
[3.1 safety (protection from violent, deranged or diseased inmates, fire protection and emergency
evacuation);
14.1 inmate needs and services (clothing, nutrition, bedding, medical, dental and mental health care,
visitation time, exercise and recreation, educational and rehabilitative programming); and
(5.1 staffing (trained and adequate guards and other staff, avoidance of placing inmates in position of
authority over inmates).
"Id. at 347.
"Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, Ledbetter v. Jones, 453 U.S. 950
(1981); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3587 (1984); Villanueva
v. George, 659 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 198 1); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420,428 (4th Cir. 198 1); Ruiz v. Estelle,
650 F.2d 555, 568 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Groseclose v. Dutton, 609 F. Supp.
1432 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1121 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); See also Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd., 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Contra Wright v. Rushen,
642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981).
6"See generally, Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). (Natural-
ly, "basic" and "needs" are subjective terms, subject to court definitions.)
6679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
64id. at 1138, citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. (the quoted considerations were reviewed, as part of the record
of the lower court proceedings by the majority).
Fall, 19851 COM MENTS
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evidence reviewed. The circuit court accepted the district court's weighting of
expert testimony and empirical data under the rationale of Chapman.6, Most
importantly, the Ruiz appeal confirmed the systemic application of a totality
test of prison conditions for the Fifth Circuit and permitted specific standards
regarding space per inmate and provision of regular exercise to be imposed by
decree of the district court.'
By comparison, the Ninth Circuit67 has attempted to narrow the Chap-
man totality test to only those cases where each component condition would
separately constitute a violation of the eighth amendment.68 Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit would limit court-imposed remedies to only those which are
necessary to correct the specific violation. 9
The product of post-Chapman prison conditions litigation has clearly
been a growing division among the circuit courts as to whether combined con-
ditions, not separately rising to an unconstitutional level, can, in the aggregate,
become unconstitutional by virtue of their combined impact on the inmate.
The second level of inquiry raised by the differing constructions of Chapman is
the extent to which a court may order a comprehensive remedy to correct the
violative conditions.
In those jurisdictions where the totality analysis permits consideration of
the aggregate of confinement conditions," and where detailed, intensive
remedies may be ordered by the court, a set of model standards are being
judicially created.7' Jurisdictions avoiding aggregate impact analysis and "in-
trusive remedies"" remain locked into the abstract, hands-off eighth amend-
ment approach that precludes correction of all but the most shocking of con-
finement environments, without identifying specific standards or establishing
thresholds of constitutionality.
TOTALITY ON DEATH Row
For the inmate condemned to death, the evolution of a practical eighth
11d. at 115. (in regard to overcrowding claims, the Ruiz court considered length of prison term, length of in-
cell confinement, scientific recommendations and data tending to show that the circumstances may lead to
physical and mental health impairment.)
old. (Note that the final order extended to other facets of prison conditions with specific requirements for
compliance, as well.) Accord Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977).
"See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.
1981).
"Hoptowit, 682 F.2d 1246; Wright, 642 F.2d 1129. See also. Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1984).
"Hoptowit, 682 F.2d 1246; Wright, 642 F.2d 1129. See also, Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F.
Supp. 1558 (D. Idaho 1984); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
'See, e.g., Ruiz, 679 F.2d II 15; Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
1759 (198 1). (The Fifth and Tenth Circuits represent strong judicial activist jurisdictions, in the area of
prison reform, with growing support from the Seventh Circuit).
"See. e.g.. Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1165-83. (Detailed consent decree is appended to the appellate decision).
"See, e.g., Wright, 642 F.2d 1129. (Ninth Circuit stridently opposed to judicial intervention).
[Vol. 19:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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amendment scrutiny of the constitutionality of prison conditions has become
increasingly relevant. 3 The construction of Chapman has recently arisen in
the Second"' and Sixth Circuits," with landmark implications for the death row
inmate.
In the Second Circuit case, Smith v. Coughlin,'6 plaintiff, a prisoner con-
fined to a segregated unit for condemned prisoners, challenged the conditions
of his confinement under a totality of the circumstances theory." Specifically,
Smith claimed that segregation from other inmates, limitation of contact
visitation rights to one weekly meeting with an authorized clergyman and
general prohibitions against human contact constituted a threat to his physical
and mental health which could cause him to lose his will to fight his conviction
through appeal."8
The New York district court, in ruling against Smith, 9 found that Smith's
cell was adequate in size, lighting, heating and cooling. 0 Smith had access to
an exercise area seven hours each day. Further, Smith had been provided with
regular psychiatric care for two years, with no discovery of any psychological
debilitation.' Beyond these facts, the court noted its inability to overcome an
unambiguous state statute specifically requiring segregation of condemned
prisoners.8 More than just an enabling statute giving regulation, promulgation
and general discretionary power to prison administrators, the statute was a
clear, direct expression of the legislature that could not be overturned absent a
showing that the corrections officials' interpretation of the statute was clearly
erroneous. 3 Smith prevailed, however, in his claim that denial of contact with
legal counsel and inability to keep legal papers violated his sixth amendment
"See ROBBINS. PRISONERS, RI6HTS SOURCEBOOK. 309-310 !1980). IProf. Robbins includes, in his general
coverage of prisoners' mental health, an observation that death-sentenced inmates, by virtue of the fact that
their penalty is qualitatively different from others, and the existence of state statutory provisions prohibiting
execution of the presently insane, may be entitled to more careful consideration of conditions of confine-
ment impact on mental health than that afforded the general prison population.) (Author's Note: Robbins'
assessment of mental health needs of the condemned as "special" suggests the potential for a more magnified
totality scrutiny of death row conditions, with emphasis on emotional and mental health, than that applied
to general population claim(si)
"Smith v. Coughlin, 577 F. Supp. 1055 )S.D.N.Y. 1983). affd. 748 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1984).
"See Groseclose v. Dutton, 609 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). appealfled No. 85-5525 (6th Cir. 1985):
see also. Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052 IM.D. Tenn. 1982).
'6577 F. Supp. 1055 IS.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 748 F.2d 783 12d Cir. 1984).
77Id.
"Id. at 1059.




21d. at 1059-60, citing NEw YORK CORRER- LAW § 650 (Consol. 1974). (Statutory provision calls for segre-
gation of condemned inmates and restriction of contact visitation to clergy, prison officials and family
members.)
"Id. at 1060; 748 F.2d at 787. (Statute expressly prohibiting condemned inmate's confinement in general
prison population precluded any protected liberty interest in remaining in the general population; statute
was designed to further prison security objectives).
COMMENTSFall, 19851
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right of access to the courts."'
In Groseclose v. Dutton,"5 an action was brought, originating as a claim
by next friend, that death row inmate Ronald Harries' announcement that he
would forego his appeals of right was an involuntary waiver of appellate
review produced by the conditions of confinement on death row., The volun-
tariness of Harries' waiver decision and the constitutionality of death row con-
ditions were bifurcated into two claims. 7 The court noted that the facility
housing the death row at issue had been adjudged as unconstitutional by virtue
of overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, medical care, excessive violence,
idleness and improper prisoner classification in Grubbs v. Bradley."8
While the Grubbs court found unconstitutionally violative conditions, it
also held, using rationale akin to that employed by the Ninth Circuit, that only
those conditions which individually or together rise to a "severe" or shocking
level will be actionable; interrelationship of conditions and/or failure to
rehabilitate a prisoner will not necessarily present a meritorious claim.8 9 Like
the Ninth Circuit, the Grubbs court embraced a judicial application of remedy
to prison conditions that would be the least intrusive means to amelioration."
The Grubbs court did, however, acknowledge the potential for an interrelated
totality claim where, for example, there was shown to be a sufficient connec-
tion between a prisoner classification system and excessive violence.9 Thus,
while not embracing a Tenth Circuit-type totality approach92 that would incor-
porate consideration of psychological or emotional impact, the Grubbs court
did not expressly reject such an approach.
Tying its construction of the Chapman totality test to the (need to accord)
"wide-ranging deference [to the] decisions of prison administrators,"93 the
Grubbs court avoided reinforcement of judicial abstention by confining its
decision to the single and aggregate unconstitutionality of the conditions at
issue.94 In sum, the Tennessee district court did not believe the facts presented
in Grubbs required subtle aggregate impact scrutiny or "intrusive" remedy.9"
"Id. at 1062.
"609 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); See also, Groseclose v. Dutton, 594 F. Supp. 949, 962 (M.D. Tenn.
1984) (District court held Harries' waiver involuntary and induced by unconstitutional conditions.)
"Groseclose, 594 F. Supp. at 962.
"Id. at 1434.




"See, e.g., Ramos, 639 F.2d 559, 566.
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The effect of the Grubbs holding on the Groseclose claim was to narrow
examination of the prison system to death row, as a "separate prison within a
prison," since the Grubbs remedial order had been broad and non-specific, and
because subsequent death row administrative policy changes had not been ad-
dressed.' Thus, the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee cer-
tified a class of present and future death row inmates.97
Plaintiffs presented a claim that the totality of the conditions on death
row violated their eighth amendment rights, to wit: poor ventilation, heating,
cooling and lighting of cells; inadequate provision of out-of-cell exercise; inade-
quate inmate classification; and poor psychological services.9" Expert
testimony tending to show that death row "inmates face unique psychological
crises that inmates in the general population do not face"99 was presented to
the court to support the argument that "the factors that go to a determination
of whether the totality of conditions on death row constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment should receive different weights than the factors that are
examined in a non-death row conditions case."''
In responding to this argument in the affirmative, the Groseclose court
stands out as a compassionate Sixth Circuit pioneer. Phrasing its "principal
concern" as inmate idleness and prison officials' neglect of the condemned
prisoners' emotional well-being, the Groseclose court set forth a plan, under
the supervision of a court-appointed "special master,"'' to remedy the
unhealthy sanitation, lighting and exercise factors, inadequate provision for in-
mate interaction with other people, lack of spiritual and psychological counsel-
ing and the arbitrary segregation of all death row inmates. 102
'Groseclose. 609 F. Supp. at 1441.
111d. at 1434.
"Id. at 1435-38. The Court ultimately found that the cells, on the average, afforded only enough space to
take three paces, turn around, and take three paces back. The temperatures in the cells varied from extreme-
ly high (mid-eighties) in the summer, to winter lows sufficient to make a visiting psychiatric expert "shiver."
Absence of natural light in most of death row and single low wattage bulbs light the cells, adversely impact-
ing on sleep cycles and causing many inmates to remain in bed twenty hours a day or more.
The cells are without windows or ventilation, so paint fumes, poorly-functioning in-cell toilets and
cigarette smoke odors permeate the air. Due to poor ventilation, inmates avoid using insect sprays to reduce
the rampant insect infestation in the cells. Inmates are not classified for special treatment or for security pur-
poses; all death row inmates are considered high risk security problems. Inmates receive one hour of out-
door exercise per day, with no access to the gym, work programs, congregate religious services or law library
visitation (though they "order" law books). Similarly, education programs and in-cell work are not provided
by the state. Fire safety provision and sanitary eating facilities are suspect.
The "special" emotional needs of condemned inmates are not met; rare visits by a counselor are conducted
without privacy. Visitation is restricted to one or two visitors per week for one or two hours, depending on
the distance traveled, and two telephones for collect calls are available for daily use. Officers are trained by
the State's Department of Corrections, but receive no special training for death row. Selected death row in-
mates are used for collecting meal trays and cleaning catwalks; they are the only inmates permitted out of
their cells for more than the exercise or shower period.
"Id. at 1446.
1'"d.
"'Id. at 1148. (Special masters act as enforcement supervisors and are generally selected for their knowledge
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The Groseclose court particularly emphasized the propriety of prison im-
plementation of inmate evaluation and classification plans for death row in-
mates as being "logical, economic and effective."" 3 However, the court avoid-
ed full-blown intrusion into prison administration by couching its emphatic
suggestion of classification in deferential terms and stating that "nothing in
this [decision] should be interpreted as requiring that Ideath row inmatesl
should be integrated into the general population.""'4
The rationale underlying the Groseclose suggestion of individualized
treatment of the death row prisoner reflects the court's view that death row
conditions cases do require different factoral weighting from that applied
under a totality analysis to a general population conditions claim. The court
notes both the condemned person's right to die a dignified death' and the
death-sentenced individual's keen interest in maintaining a record of good
behavior as constituting a hearty countervailant to security fears:
The average death row inmate spends six to ten years pursuing appeals.
Death sentenced inmates are aware that their institutional record while
on death row could influence their chances for clemency; but, perhaps
more significantly, the presence of a classification system could have the
effect of improving the mental and physical health of the inmates.
Specifically, inmates could be classified to identify death row inmates with
serious emotional problems." '
It is clear from Groseclose. that beyond the potential for Sixth Circuit
adoption of either an aggregate impact/intrusive remedy construction of Chap-
man or a conservative interpretation styled after the Ninth Circuit, Groseclose
may create a third category of prison conditions analysis that proceeds on the
theory that death row inmates and their conditions of confinement command a
very special application of eighth amendment totality. Such an application
would include an analytical approach that acknowledges the reversibility of
capital sentencing, the right of the prisoner to await clemency or execution
with dignity and peace, and the need of the condemned to come to terms with
'"'ld
'1S1d. at 1440, citing Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 363 15th Cir). cert. denied. 104 S. Ct. 1458 (19841
(The Fifth Circuit held that allowing the condemned plaintiff to be strapped to a gurney, intravenous tubes
inserted into his arm in preparation for lethal injection, for 63 minutes Iduring which time, the angry crowd
assembled outside, chanting, "kill him! Kill him!"l until his execution was stayed, did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment.) See also. Executions: New Rules of Etiquette. Newsweek. January 23, 19 84 at 27.
ISubsequent to James David Autry's ordeal, the Texas Board of Corrections adopted "some more humane
rules of execution etiquette." Henceforth, the condemned Texas inmate will not be intravenously intubated
until after midnight on the date of the execution. the death chamber will be air-conditioned and enlarged and
outside barricades will keep demonstrators out of earshot. Newsweek notes ironically that "JAjfter these
niceties, of course, the outcome remains the same."
"'Groseclose. 609 F. Supp. 1440.
IVol. I19:2
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THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN: IDLENESS
The Groseclose district court decision avoided the potential for conflict
with the Second Circuit's Smith v. Coughlin' t1 ruling by distinguishing the
facts of Smith"'. The Groseclose court noted the adequacy of Smith's cell, the
provision of good ventilation, lighting, heating and cooling on New York's
death row and Smith's access to regular outdoor exercise, medical care and
legal assistance."'
Implicitly holding that the constitutional minimum for conditions of con-
finement includes adequate sanitation and medical care provision, the Distict
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee broke new ground when it phrased
as "the principal concern of the Court,""' the idleness and extended in-cell con-
finement of death row inmates."' Citing expert testimony that tended to show
that round-the-clock in-cell confinement, unnecessary limitation on human
contact, absence of natural light and lack of recreational or vocational pro-
grams for death row inmates would compound condemned inmate despair and
possibly lead to anti-social behavior, the court obviously viewed the ostensible
prison security objective of these practices as being ironically, if inadvertently,
compromised."' While this evaluation was certainly progressive, it rests on a
theory that is neither new nor innovative. In 1969, Tom Murton, Professor of
Criminology, accepted the position of superintendent of the Arkansas State
penitentiary, Tucker Prison Farm."' Murton's appointment was part of a
"demonstration project which would convince the decision-makers that a
prison can be operated without brutality and torture."5
By expanding condemned inmate privileges and responsibilities, Professor
Murton observed renewed hope in the death row inmates. Inmates were per-
mitted out of their cells for contact with other inmates, physical exercise, and
"'See generallv E. KUBLER-Ross. ON DEATH AND DYING (1973) (Physician, humanist and student of the ter-
minally ill, Dr. Kubler-Ross' widely-accepted principles depict the stages through which patients, by receiv-
ing a grim diagnosis, come to terms with the real possibility of their own death, and the indefinite length and
circumstances of their remaining lifetime, while retaining hope for eventual "'reprieve.")
"748 F.2d 784 12d Cir. 19841.
"'Groseclose. 609 F. Supp. at 1444-45.
"'Id. at 1441 Iciting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 11978)). iThe district court notes the Hutto Court's em-
phasis on the heightened violation created when denial of proper health care takes place over an extended
period of time.I
"Id. at 1446.
id. See also. Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 197 1) (Regular outdoor exercise for death
row inmates required, where it was found, economically and from a security standpoint, to be feasible).
"'Groseclose. 609 F. Supp. at 1446.
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work projects including painting and repairs of the cell-block and kitchen and
janitorial assignment in the general population facilities. Ultimately, total
reclassification of all the death row inmates to minimum security status, with
the single exception of housing, was successfully implemented."6
Murton's hypothesis underlying his renaissance in corrections was that "a
person will generally tend to respond in the same fashion in which he is ad-
dressed. An inmate treated like an animal is most likely to respond like an ani-
mal,. ...7 Murton's trust and liberalization of the death row inmates were re-
warded; the condemned inmates "became the model prisoners of the institu-
tion.""'
The probability of a relationship between a deprivational death row en-
vironment and inmate violence finds support in both media coverage of prison
outbursts"9 and in scientific principles of human behavior. Corrections experts,
prison employees and civil libertarians posit that violence occurs in response to
frustration, depression,' and inhumanity of prison conditions.' Lengthy con-
finement on death row has been linked to hyprochondriasis,'22 with any im-
proved ego strength during the course of confinement found to be linked to op-
portunity for and development of group identification.'23
Unfounded physical complaints are generally related to hidden anxiety
and depression. 4 Depersonalization neurosis, a painful depression-linked syn-
drome, may be caused by sensory deprivation. 5 While no scientific studies
have emerged which specifically focus on death row inmate psychodynamics,
the dangerous implications of exacerbating depression and anxiety already pro-
duced by capital sentencing are readily apparent.
Undoubtedly, the diminishment of inmate ego strength, energy and hope
via unnecessarily harsh penal restrictions does little to deter recidivism and





"'See. e.g.. Mussner, Lucasville Hostage Siege Blamed on Crowding, Cleve. Plain Dealer, Oct. 16, 1985. at
!-A (Media account of death row inmate involvement in kidnapping of prison guards meant to register com-
plaints against living conditions in Ohio's maximum security prison. Unions representing prison employees
and members of civil liberties organizations blamed Lucasville's overcrowding and understaffing as the
cause of this and similar outbursts).
12ld.
'Murton, supra note 114 at 94-109.
'




'"'A. NICHOLI, HARVARD GUIDE TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 195-96 (1978).
'Id. at 194-95.
'-.See, generally D. FOUEL '.. We Are the Living Proof'... THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS, (1975).
(Author's note: fear of recidivism in death-sentenced individuals seems peculiarly ironic.)
[Vol. 19:2
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Judicial recognition of the special needs of the condemned and the
psychological impact of unnecessarily harsh conditions of death row is
evidenced in federal court orders in Texas, California, Georgia and Kentucky
requiring expansion of out-of-cell time and stimulating activity for condemned
prisoners.' Psychological treatment opportunities are expanding for prisoners,
as well.' 28
In Kentucky, death row inmates presently receive approximately five and
three-fourths hours of out-of-cell time per day, seven days a week, with out-
door and gymnasium exercise regularly available.'29 Kentucky's condemned
are also permitted to dine in the prison's general population dining room. 3
Similarly, twenty of Arizona's sixty-three death row inmates have been
classified for housing outside of death row and are able to dine with the general
population and enjoy daily one-hour outdoor exercise.'3'
The Ruiz v. Estelle consent decree making like provision for death row
recreation opportunities withstood state challenge" and remains a model
remedial plan.'33 Subsequent modification of the Ruiz decree provided for work
capability evaluation and integration of condemned prisoners into the
freedoms and facilities of the general prison population, over a three-month ex-
perimental period.'34 By definition, the consent decree did not perpetually bind
the defendants to compliance, but the success of the experimental program has
led to a prison administration plan to provide death row inmates with mean-
ingful employment opportunities, though the inmates are no longer housed
with general population prisoners.'35 Currently, all Texas death row inmates
are guaranteed at least fifteen hours a week of out-of-cell recreation.'36 Upon
completion of construction of a garment factory adjacent to death row,
capable prisoners will be given employment.'37
In California, those death row inmates classified as "Grade A" are entitled
"'
27Access to unpublished consent decrees was gained via the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
'
2 See, generally, Brenner & Galanti, Prisoners'Rights to Psychiatric Care, 21 IDAHo L. REV. I (1985).
'
29Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 14, citing Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21, 33, 36 (W.D. Ky.
198 1). (Policies are reflected in the Kentucky State Penitentiary's Operations Manual, on file with the court).
13"d.
11Id.
"'Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982).
-see supra note 4, Brief for Amicus Curiae, at 6.
"'Ruiz v. McKaskle, Civ. Action No. H-78-987 (Stipulation and Order Regarding Death Row Conditions of
Oct. 14, 1983).
"'See supra note 4, Brief for Amicus Curiae, at 8-9 citing Stipulation Regarding Death Row Conditions and
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to six hours of out-of-cell activity per day, seven days a week.' Grade A
prisoners may also dine outside of their cells together and may attend group
religious services.' 3 Death row inmates not classified as "Grade A" are still af-
forded twelve hours of outdoor exercise per week.'"
Under a similar decree ordered in Georgia, condemned "H-House"
residents receive at least thirty-two hours of out-of-cell time per week, at least
six of which are designated as outdoor exercise time.'' Sports equipment must
be provided, and inmates classified as eligible receive group religious service ac-
cess and various hobby opportunities.' 2
The successful implementation of court orders either urging or requiring
death row inmate evaluation for classification and directing minimum levels of
out-of-cell time belie administrative fears that such actions will compromise
prison security. Indeed, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund's
lengthy investigations as to death row conditions and the practicality of reme-
dial provisions for inmate stimulation indicate quite the contrary.' 3 The fund,
in its amicus curiae brief in the Groceclose appeal, " asserts that the conditions
of Tennessee's death row, and especially the unnecessary restriction placed on
inmate's exercise, lag far behind contemporary eighth amendment standards.
IMPACT ON OHIO
Should the Sixth Circuit affirm the district court holding in Groseclose,
Ohio's corrections system will be forced to upgrade considerably the conditions
of death row at the Marysville and Lucasville State Correctional Facilities.
Pursuant to statutory authority, 5 the Ohio Department of Corrections has
promulgated rules limiting Lucasville's condemned men to two hours of out-of-
cell time per week, with outdoor exercise provided at guard discretion once
every three weeks.'" Death row inmates are locked in screened cages during
visitation, thus causing many Lucasville condemned men to forego visitation
out of sheer humiliation.' 7 A new death row facility constructed to house up to
eighty inmates is described as not being a significant improvement over the
"Thompson v. Enomoto. No. 79-1630 SAW (N.D. Cal. October 23, 1980).
1d.
"'Id.
"'Daniels v. Zant, Civ. Action No. 79-110-MAC (M.D. Ga. June 5, 1981).
"'Id.
"'See vupra note 7.
'"No. 85-5525 (6th Cir. 1985).
1"OHIo REv CODE ANN. § 5145.03 (Baldwin 1981).
"Remarks of the members, Meeting of the Ohio Death Penalty Task Force Committee on Death Row Con-
ditions foct. II. 1985) Ihereinafter cited as Remarks of the members). (Ohio characterized as "behind the
times" in corrections.) See also, Baird, Death Row Unjust. Johnston Claims. Cleve. Plain Dealer, July 8.
1984, § 2 at 3. col. I (Death row inmate Dale N. Johnston describes a typical day on death row, including ar-
bitrary ten minute shower limit and the requirement that twenty men share one razor).
"'Remarks of the members; see also. Baird, Death Row Unjust. Johnston Claims supra note 146.
[Vol. 19:2
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former arrangement which housed death row inmates with those prisoners seg-
regated for disciplinary purposes.'"
A recent fire on Marysville's antiquated death row for women has ele-
vated the already great concern for Ohio's three female death row residents.' 9
Marysville's death row is a misnomer, as the three condemned prisoners are
housed in the "administrative control unit" for problem inmates. 5' The
Marysville death row inmates' manual suggests the possibility of work assign-
ment; though, practically, such opportunity does not exist.'5 Educational pro-
grams are subject to the approval of the prison's superintendent and may only
be entered into by correspondence and at the inmate's expense. 2 Marysville
prisoners are permitted out of their cells even less frequently than their
Lucasville counterparts." 3 Group religious services are off-limits to
Marysville's condemned, and psychological services are provided only once
every four months, unless a greater need is evident to the supervising staff.'14
At least one civil rights action challenging Ohio death row conditions has
been filed,' with more likely to follow. Sixth Circuit determination of
Groseclose should spark executive or legislative action to improve Ohio's con-
ditions of confinement for its growing death row population.'56
CONCLUSION
Eighth amendment scrutiny of condemned prisoner treatment has steadi-
ly progressed from a narrow finding of a constitutional prohibition against
physical torture to the present inquiry: whether death row conditions under
some administrations may constitute unconstitutional mental torture. As
judicial remedies erode the previously-absolute discretion of corrections of-
ficials, and more death row inmates are revealed by the media as being more
"'Remarks of the members. supra note 146.
-1Id.
1' Id. This practice, and others attributable to Ohio's female death row facility at the state's Reformatory for
women at Marysville. Ohio. were observed by this author during inmate assistance visits sponsored by the




3 1d. Marysville's policies for the treatment of death row inmates are reflected in numerous memoranda
("post orders") issued to prison staff, developed and distributed by the superintendent of the facility, and also
set forth in the orientation booklet ("inmate manual") given to inmates upon arrival at the prison. Copies of
these policy documents were obtained by the author.
'"See supra note 150.
'"Williams v. Ohio, C 2-84-1707 (ED. Ohio 1984) Pro se complaint filed by death row inmate Lewis
Williams, Jr. on lined yellow paper, without the knowledge of his counsel. The complaint's "certificate of
service" made reference to the use of institutional "kite" (intra-prison mail) to give notice to the defendant.
Williams' complaint was ultimately dismissed without prejudice, thereby leaving open the possibility of a
death row class action.
"'Report of David Stebbins. Assistant Ohio State Public Defender, to the Ohio Death Penalty Task Force
(June 4, 1984). (As of June of 1984, there has been 273 indictments under Ohio's capital punishment law.
with 27 Ohioans under sentence of death.)
COMMENTSFall. 19851
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than "depraved animals .. out of George Raft movies with long fangs,"'57
courts applying the Trop v. Dulles '5 "evolving standards of decency"'5 9 will
undoubtedly adopt the view of Nobel laureate Albert Camus in his Reflections
on the Guillotine:'16 "When justice, which is supposed to protect the honest
man, sickens him instead, it is difficult to believe that it can bring order and
peace in the city."''
NANCY HOLLAND
"'See supra note I (Assistant Superintendent of Lucasville, Steve Dillon proceeds to describe some of death
row's long-time residents as "'rather likeable, well-adjusted, soft-spoken, graying men who collect stamps.")
See also, LEVINE. DEATH Row: AN AFFIRMATION OF LIFE (1972). (Compilation of literary works authored by
death row inmates.)
" Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
'"Id. at 101.
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